[By Chuck Almdale]
[NOTE: If maps, pictures and legends don’t display properly in your email, go to the blog. Interactive Google maps may not work in your email but will work on the blogsite. There is a link at the bottom to the entire Mongol Empire & Rus’ series.]
Looks crowded doesn’t it, but locations differentiate as you zoom in. Interactive Google MyMap above shows all locations for Rus’ 9th-13th centuries and Mongol Eastern and Central European invasion 1236-42 CE. Click on any marker or line for description. If map doesn’t display properly in your email, go to the blog.
The Deep Ditches and Stone Walls Theory of Withdrawal from Central Europe
After dispensing with the best-known and longest-held arguments — the political theory, the ecological theory, the limited goals/gradual conquest theory, and the military weakness theory, historian Stephen Pow arrives at what he thinks is the theory most likely to be true, which is succinctly stated in his thesis title: Deep ditches and well-built walls: a reappraisal of the mongol withdrawal from Europe in 1242. In chapter 2 of his thesis, his lead paragraph briefly states his theory.
For a long time after I began reading and writing on this topic — why the Mongols didn’t continue into Central And Western Europe but stopped at Hungary — I leaned strongly towards the Political Theory, specifically that the death of Khagan Ögedei forced them to withdraw from Hungary in order to return to Karakorum, bury Ögedei and elect a new Khagan. This was for three reasons: I had read something decades ago to this effect; in virtually all the books and web sources that I initially read, this was the only theory offered; the timing seemed right. Ögedei dies, it takes three months for the Mongols in Hungary to get the word, when they do they immediately pack up and head back east. A compact package with a nice neat little knot on the top. The Environmental Theory came in a close second; perhaps the Mongols got sick and tired of being bogged down in all those marshy springtime fields. Perhaps both theories applied.
Unfortunately — or rather fortunately, as it’s always good to be disabused of significant error — I later came to conclude this explanation was completely wrong. It is Stephen Pow’s writings on the subject to which I give most of the credit. When I first saw his explanation in brief — the Mongols couldn’t get through the stone walls and the Hungarians fended them off long enough for them to change their minds and leave — I thought “Yeah. Right. Tough guy Hungarians, tough guy Europeans, did what all previous nations couldn’t do — defeat the Mongols. Sounds like the Europeans, Pow included, are breaking their arms by patting themselves on the back.” But after reading Pow’s disassembly of the earlier theories and presentation of his own “Stone Walls” theory, I completely changed my opinion. Then, after reading Pow’s paper (The Last Campaign and Death of Jebe Noyan’, summarized here) on the mysterious disappearance of General Jebe in 1223, a problem rarely addressed and unsolved in 800 years, I decided Pow may well be the best historian now working on the Mongols, and was worth paying attention to.
Stephen Pow’s Theory
[The] Mongols evacuated Europe in early 1242 primarily because of military problems they were encountering during the campaign. As they advanced westward, they were being forced to engage primarily in siege warfare which negated many of the nomadic horseman’s advantages such as speed of advance, mobility, and the ability to fight at a distance. Moreover, the sedentary population drastically increased with each westward advance, and the number of fortified places resultantly increased. Individually, these places may have been insignificant to the overall success of Batu’s operations, but when there were overwhelming numbers of unconquered strongholds, it became impossible for strategic reasons to continue to bypass them. To compound matters, with each advance, these castles, monasteries, citadels, and walled towns were becoming more sophisticated in their defenses. [Emphasis added.]
The rest of this and the following installment draw directly from Pow’s paper (pgs. 46-78), significantly abridged. Some of Pow’s detail and nuance will be lost, and I encourage anyone who wants the full fascinating story to go directly to Pow’s paper, which can be found in full at: https://prism.ucalgary.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/f409356a-4e0d-4fa2-afa7-7add6193f94b/content
Primary Criticisms of the “Stone Walls” Theory
1. By 1214 the Mongols had the best army, the best siege equipment and the best artillery corps in Eurasia.
2. The Mongols expected sieges against any sedentary society and had fought many sieges for almost forty years.
The Demographics of Europe
The areas the Mongols conquered in Eastern Europe were sparsely populated, but the farther west they went, the greater the population density they encountered. By the end of the 13th century, the population of all Europe is estimated at between 74 million (Fontana Economic History of Europe) and 94 million (Economic historian Paolo Malanima). Sample numbers:
- Russia west of Ural Mtns. (40% of European land area) 7 million
- Poland & Lithuania 2-3 million
- Hungary 2 million
- Germany 10 million
- Italy 10 million
- France & Low Countries 19 million.
Western Europe was more urbanized with more towns, more town dwellers, more feudal lords, and more castles than Eastern and East-Central Europe.
Estimates vary all over the map as to the size of the Mongol Great Western Invasion army under Batu Khan. The set we’ve been using, as of the end of the Rus’ campaign, is 60,000 to enter central Hungary, 20,000 to Poland, 20,000 to Transylvania, 30,000 to stay behind in Rus’.
Europeans were baffled by how numerous the Mongols seemed to be, largely the result of their having up to eight separate armies simultaneously in the field over a vast front hundreds of miles long. When the Poles’ crushing defeat at Legnica was followed by the Hungarian’s disastrous defeat at Mohi, two days later and 400 miles to the south, Europe was stunned, bewildered and terrified. Matthew of Paris wrote: “Where have such a people, who are so numerous, till now lain concealed?” But the Mongols often used levies of locals in sieges, increasing their apparent numbers, and in their favorite feigned retreat tactic, additional armies of thousands of Mongols would suddenly erupt from hiding. Additionally, those who lose battles tend to boost their estimates of the size of the enemy army, making themselves look less incompetent in the process. If the Mongols continued west into the Holy Roman Empire, the small size of their army relative to the totality of western forces would worsen daily.
Prior to his death in 1227, Genghis Khan likely had little information about Europe save what Subutai told him upon his return from the Caucasus and Cuman steppe in 1224. He later told his eldest son Jochi to “subjugate the ‘northern tribes’ without reinforcements” (Pow, pg. 49), apparently thinking northern Asia was all the same from east to west, sparsely populated by forest-dwelling or nomadic pastoralists tribes. But as Pow (pg. 49) puts it: “However, taking into account the number of troops sent on the western campaign, Chaghadai’s statement in the “Secret History” about there being many peoples, and Sübetei’s account of receiving trouble at their hands during his famous expedition, we can conclude that this perspective had changed by the 1230s.” A proposal to use Chinese Jin infantry against the west was vetoed: too far, strange food, bad water, lethal epidemics.
When Carpini visited Mongolia in 1246, he was astonished at how few the Mongols actually were. He reported back that Europe should never consider submission to them. He also mentioned that Mongol allies and conscripted levies would revolt if given a good opportunity.
Štramberk ears made of gingerbread; whipped cream and raspberries added. ‘Tis a far, far better thing to eat these ears than to lose one’s own. Source: Travel Potpourri – Ears from Stramberk
Much is made of Mongols cutting off the ears of their fallen foes. The Moravians turned this tale into a popular dessert — gingerbread Štramberk ears. Yet Pow could find only three references to this ear-lopping: a Chinese Jin army in the early 1230s, the Alanian capital of Maghas in 1239, and Legnica, Poland in April, 1241. Ear-counting by Mongols occurred only rarely, apparently when their foes greatly outnumbered them and they wanted to know the size of their victory.
Pow suggests that the western campaign did not go as smoothly as initially envisioned. He writes (pg. 52):
“Kirakos of Gandzak asserts that when Ögödei planned the western campaign in 1235, he decreed that the armies should not return until they had placed every kingdom under his dominion. In reality, the campaign did not progress smoothly. Very few nations were submitting. They would fight, flee westward as refugees, or lock themselves in cities which had to be reduced. Two Cuman emirs did submit, only to revolt immediately after the Mongols left the area. Sübetei was forced to move against them a second time. Another Cuman leader, Bachman, engaged in an effective guerilla campaign until Möngke finally captured him.”
Due to the difficulties, Pow suggests (pg. 53) that the famous argument between Güyük and Batu at the 1240 kurultai southeast of Rus’ was because:
“Güyüg had lost his taste for the campaign and simply declared it successfully concluded, which put him at odds with hardliners like Batu and Sübetei who were aware that there were still many nations which had not submitted. This explains why Güyüg was recalled and why the Secret History has Ögödei raging about how his son demoralized the entire army. It also explains why Batu informed Ögödei that they were holding a “parting feast” when the enmity between the princes broke out in the open, and Güyüg threatened Batu. It is certain that Batu’s campaign in Europe was still underway when the great khan died in Karakorum, so this parting feast must in fact have been Güyüg’s parting feast. The reason for Güyüg’s uncontainable hostility toward Batu was not something as banal as drinking etiquette. It was because he was going back to Mongolia in disgrace.”
Batu regretted the discord at the feast (Pow, pg. 53): “…“just at the time when, having been sent to ride against a rebellious people of a different race, we were asking ourselves whether we had been successful…”, which Secret History translator Francis Cleaves interprets to mean “Will the campaign end well?” Apparently other commanders wondered the same.
The hilltop Benedictine Archabbey of Pannonhalma,
built of stone, now modernized. Source: Wikipedia – Pannonhalma
Off the Battlefields, onto the Hilltops and behind the Walls
After Kyiv fell in December 1240, the Mongol army spread out, taking as many towns as quickly as they could, but their assaults on the hilltop towns of Danilov and Kremenets failed, and they swiftly moved on. For the next few months, most battles were what Mongols preferred — pitched battles in the open. Terror-inducing attacks on small towns and settlements also went well. But the Battle of Mohi in Hungary was touch and go; Carpini says Batu told his troops during the battle they would all die in Hungary. The Yuan Shi says (Pow, pg. 55) that Subutai stopped Batu’s attempt to flee that by insisting on continuing until they at least reached the Danube and overthrew the Magyars. Poe comments (pg. 55) on this: “The fact that an East Asian source [Yuan Shi] has Batu expressing the desire to evacuate Europe in early 1241 should immediately raise suspicions toward ideas that local resistance had nothing to do with his later decision.” [Emphasis added.] In short, Batu — as had Güyük — already had strong second thoughts shortly after entering Hungary.
The primary and secondary sources cover the Legnica and Mohi victories in great detail, the battle at Pest in less detail, and the rest of the Hungarians campaigns into 1242 in nearly no detail at all, as we saw a few installments back when trying to determine who did what and where and when. Pow feels this is — in a sense — justified, as [in my words] the post-Pest (April 1241) Hungarian sieges and standoffs are a boring litany of failures. Pow writes (pg. 55) “Yet, the drastic shift in the type of warfare which characterized the campaign was the result of an emerging awareness in Europe that offensive strategies had failed.” The European leaders decided in near-unanimity to avoid open battles against the Mongols in the field, flee if possible and hide behind the best walls one could find whenever flight was out of the question.
King Wenceslaus [Vaclav] of Bohemia was still one day away from Legnica when Duke Henry II “the Pious” of Silesia was killed in open battle and beheaded by the Mongols, and he immediately withdrew to a defensive position in the Bohemian Sudetes Mountains between Legnica and Prague. He did not approach the Mongols the entire time they ventured into and then passed by Bohemia, nor when they traveled through Moravia and close to the southeastern border of Bohemia, on their way south to Hungary. He armed monks and reconfigured monasteries into refuges for civilians. Meanwhile, in Austria, Duke Frederick II strengthened castles at his own expense. Pow writes (pg. 56-57):
“Thomas of Split mentions that throughout Europe there was a frenzy of fortifying castles and cities as people widely believed that the Mongols intended to advance on Rome. The [Holy Roman emperor Frederick II] was in central Italy…by early summer, he held a firm conviction that a defensive posture was preferable for the present. A message found in the Regesta Imperii, dated to June 20th, 1241 and intended for all his vassals in Swabia, includes a number of new military instructions. His forces were to avoid engaging the Mongols in field battles, provision every stronghold, and arm the general populace.”
Hungarian King Béla IV wrote the pope in 1250 that (Pow, pg. 57) “…the Hungarians desperately held back the Mongols along the banks of the Danube for 10 months despite the kingdom suffering from a dearth of adequate fortifications and defenders.” In Transdanubia Rogerius describes the populace attempting to gather at central locations for defense. The town of Pereg was fortified with a moat. The Mongols took it in eight days anyway, but many of their forcibly-conscripted levies died in the process. If Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II gave little-to-no help to Hungary, it was because Béla had previously given the emperor no support in his argument with the pope. Indeed, the emperor had been busily undermining Béla, trying to get him replaced; Béla knew this and was furious at the emperor. Yet the emperor allowed his own son Conrad to lead a crusade against the Mongols, although Conrad promised (Pow, pg. 58) only to defend the Empire — not Hungary — on “this side of the alps.” When the Mongols stayed in east Hungary, the crusade disbanded. The Europeans had seen that offense in the open field against the Mongols was fruitless and suicidal. Defense was the only option.
On Europe’s change in battle tactics from offensive to defensive, Pow writes (pg. 58):
Leaving the Hungarians to their fate was not a humanitarian gesture, but it was a prudent one. I have demonstrated that Europeans in areas threatened by the Mongol invasion were now employing defensive strategies. As such, it was a sensible idea for those in the Latin West to remain within their own borders as there was a great disparity in the quality of fortifications between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Eastern Hungary, where the Mongols had concentrated, lagged behind the Latin states in the development of fortifications. To march into Hungary and fight in the open with opponents who already had achieved great successes in pitched battle would be a terrible risk and would negate what possible advantages those in the Latin West had against the Mongols.
Esztergom Castle today. Source: Europe Between East & West – A Last Bastion
A Study on Castles
Stephen Pow (pgs. 59-60) brings to our attention a study historian Erik Fügedi made on Hungarian castles. Fügedi noted that following the Battle of Mohi (11 Apr 1241) 29 counties fell under Mongol occupation; each county had a so-called “comital” [belonging to a count or earl] castle at the center; five of the six castles that survived the invasion had been built on elevated ground; all of these castles were built not of stone but of earth, wood and clay. Mongol siege methods of bombardment, moat-filling and wall-storming worked very well against castles located on flat plains and defended only by walls of wood, earth or clay. This included Pest, which fell after only a few days. Advised to flee the town, the people opted rather to “dig a ditch, throw up a rampart, weave wicker barricades and make all sorts of useless preparations,” none of which did any good at all. According to Fügedi’s analysis there were only ten “new-style” stone castles in Hungary at the time, five were on the Austrian border (built to defend against the argumentative Austrians); the other five of stone were on hilltops and survived the Mongol attacks. Fügedi points out that unlike Central and Eastern Europe, Western Europe had a great many “new-style” stone castles, most built during the early 13th century on the tops of hills. Double-walls, undermining-resistant, flanking towers, water cisterns, arrow loops and angled anti-battering ram entrances were standard. They were the fruit of the emperor’s long siege-wars against the Italians and the Papacy, and this is what the Mongols would be besieging, not clay castles with wooden walls.
It was due to their seemingly-endless feudal warfare that Western and West-central Europe had built far more structures of stone than had Hungary, Poland and the fractious Rus’ principalities. In this sense, the inability of Western Europeans to get along with one another made them more prepared to resist their most serious invasion ever from the east. It’s much like inoculation against viral infection: a small infection peremptorily received can fend off far worse in the future. This probably wouldn’t be true if humans were more angelic and less prone towards disagreement and violence at all levels of societal organization. But we are. As it was, even though Hungary had far fewer stone defensive structures than their forever-feuding neighbors to the west, the Mongol experience of one unrewarding siege after another against stone walls quickly became a nightmare and the Mongols figuratively and literally “hit the wall.”
Interactive Google MyMap above shows all locations for Central Asian conquest 1220-1224 CE. Click on any marker or line for description. If map doesn’t display properly in your email, go to the blog.
Entire Mongol Empire & Rus’ Series: Click Here
First Installment: Why didn’t the Mongols Conquer Europe in the 13th Century?
Previous Installment: The Military Weakness Theory || Mongol Empire CXI
Next Installment: Pitched Battles versus Sieges || Mongol Empire CXIII
This Installment: The Stone Walls Theory || Mongol Empire CXII
Source
Deep ditches and well-built walls: a reappraisal of the Mongol withdrawal from Europe in 1242; Pow, Lindsey Stephen, 2012; Department of History, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada. Link to free thesis PDF.
ChukarBlog 